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Resumo
A relação entre reputação organizacional e desempenho ﬁnanceiro das empresas tem
sido alvo de estudo ao longo dos últimos anos. Empresas com elevados padrões de
reputação apresentam maior probabilidade de manter um elevado e sustentado desem-
penho ao longo do tempo. Seguindo esta linha de pensamento, acionistas que investem
em empresas com elevada reputação exigem menos rendibilidades, uma vez que, à
partida, o risco a que estão sujeitos é menor.
Com o intuito de estudar se empresas com elevada reputação, medida pela presença
no ranking de 2015 World's Most Admired Companies da revista Fortune, rejeitam a
hipótese das rendibilidades anormais serem iguais a zero, garantindo, por sua vez, um
risco inferior, foram utilizados dados em painel que incluem 24,486 observações, entre
26 de dezembro 2014 e 1 de janeiro 2016, de uma amostra total de 462 empresas norte
americanas cotadas nos índices bolsistas NYSE e NASDAQ.
Palavras-chave: reputação, desempenho ﬁnanceiro, rendibilidades anor-
mais, risco
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Abstract
The relationship between organisational reputation and ﬁrms' ﬁnancial performance
has been subject of study over the last few years. Firms with high reputation standards
experience higher chances of keeping a sustained superior performance over the course
of time. Following this logic, shareholders who invest in ﬁrms with high reputation,
expect smaller stock returns, since the risk that they are exposed is smaller.
In order to learn if reputable ﬁrms, measured by its presence in the 2015 World's Most
Admired Companies ranking of Fortune's magazine, reject the assumption of abnormal
returns being equal to zero, securing in turn a lesser risk, it has been used a panel data
analysis which includes 24,486 ﬁrm-year observations, between December 26th, 2014
and January 1st, 2016, of a full sample of 462 U.S. ﬁrms listed in the NYSE and
NASDAQ stock exchanges.
Keywords: reputation, ﬁrms' ﬁnancial performance, abnormal returns,
risk
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is a formal acknowledge that reputation plays an important role on ﬁrms stra-
tegic responses to environmental threats, as Walker (2010), Fombrun and Shanley
(1990), and Roberts and Dowling (2002) demonstrated on their researches. Several
studies concerning reputation and ﬁrms' behaviour have been made over the years by
a wide range of authors. For Weigelt and Camerer (1988), reputation is described as
an asset derived from ﬁrms' past actions, and it might be related with ﬁrms' future
rents. Consistent with that, Vergin and Qoronﬂeh (1998) also believed that ﬁrms could
develop reputation by means of their past ﬁnancial performance indexes. Therefore, a
positive reputation is highly valued by ﬁrm's shareholders and stakeholders. Regard-
ing such positions, further authors, including Barnett et al. (2006) and Pfarrer et al.
(2010), continued to explore how reputation might act as a strategic performance tool
for ﬁrms.
Additionally, Roberts and Dowling (2002) also conﬁrmed such relationship between
corporate reputation and ﬁrms' performance. According to this authors, ﬁrms with
better reputation standards outperformed their rivals, conclusion that led Roberts and
Dowling (2002) to support the hypothesis that reputation might become a strategic re-
source for ﬁrms. Moreover, and since reputation is rare and diﬃcult to imitate, Roberts
and Dowling (2002) believed that reputation might be also responsible for increasing
ﬁrms' proﬁtability and to the creation of competitive barriers. Besides, in a literature
review performed by Chun (2005), reputation has been characterised as an eﬀective
tool on managing the stakeholders' behaviour towards an organisation. Chun (2005)
described such behaviour as employee retention, customer satisfaction and loyalty, and
good staﬀ attraction. Furthermore, Chun (2005) also described that reputation might
encourage shareholders to invest in a ﬁrm, since reputation is positively correlated with
superior overall returns, although adjusted to the risk.
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Concerning the ﬁrms' ﬁnancial performance overview, good reputation standards may
also lead to a decrease on ﬁrms' costs, enabling those ﬁrms to charge premium prices
within their actual and future markets (Roberts and Dowling, 2002).
In the light of this literature addresses about reputation, Walker (2010) mentioned
how important should reputation receive constant management attention, due to its
increasing signiﬁcance on competitive markets.
Therefore, the research's aim is to analyse if ﬁrms listed on the 2015 ranking of Fortune's
World's Most Admired Companies yield abnormal returns and a small systematic risk.
Then, we will proceed to the analysis of ﬁrms' returns, comparing both from ﬁrms
listed on Fortune and not listed in the same ranking. After that, we will tie both
concepts in order to understand how the abnormal returns, as well as the systematic
risk, behave from situation one, ﬁrms listed on Fortune, to situation two, ﬁrms not
listed on Fortune. To accomplish that, we will use a sample of 462 U.S. ﬁrms quoted in
the NYSE and NASDAQ stock exchanges. Half of this sample concerns to ﬁrms listed
on Fortune's WMAC, wherein the other half relates to ﬁrms outside of this ranking in
the year of 2015.
In the light of the previous events, we expect to have some change on the abnormal
returns, as well as in the systematic risk, when comparing ﬁrms listed on Fortune to
ﬁrms not listed in the same ranking. In order to accomplish that, we will propose an
adaptation on CAPM along with a panel data study between December 26th, 2014 and
January 1st, 2016.
This document is structured as follows: chapter 2 explores some academic reviews,
wherein a broader understanding about reputation is undertaken, such as some literat-
ure current deﬁnitions, measuring tools, and its association to organisations' ﬁnancial
performance. Chapter 3 focuses on the empirical study, including the research hypo-
theses and main objectives, sample and data descriptive analysis, and model's descrip-
tion. In chapter 4 we present and discuss the main results of our research. Finally,
chapter 5 concludes, with some guidelines for future investigation.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter has the main purpose to present some academic background that supports
our research. On the prosecution of such goal, we introduce in this chapter some
deﬁnitions about corporate reputation, as well as some measures on what reputation
relies. We will further present in this chapter some past empirical researches concerning
the relationship between corporate reputation and ﬁrm's ﬁnancial performance.
2.1 Corporate Reputation Deﬁnitions
According to Boyd et al. (2010), reputation has been one of the most important stra-
tegic resources allocated to organisations. The same authors suggested that reputation
helps to distinguish ﬁrms from competitors, reducing information asymmetry and con-
sumer uncertainty, and substituting for expensive governance mechanisms.
Regarding previous researches, Weigelt and Camerer (1988) deﬁned corporate reputa-
tion as a set of attributes assigned to ﬁrms, inferred from ﬁrms' past actions. Concern-
ing the position of Fombrun and Shanley (1990), reputation signals stakeholders about
how a ﬁrm's products, jobs, strategies, and prospects compare to those of competing
ﬁrms. Alike, Hammond and Slocum (1996) expressed that reputation plays an im-
portant role within organisations, since investment bankers, corporate managers, and
recruiters routinely rely on ﬁrm's reputation in making a wide range of decisions.
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Additional literature, for instance Fombrun and Van Riel (1997), identiﬁed six diﬀerent
constructs for corporate reputation:
• The economic view portrays reputation as a character trait that describes a ﬁrm's
probable behaviour in a particular situation;
• The strategic view deﬁnes reputation as an intangible asset that is diﬃcult for
rivals to imitate, acquire, or substitute, providing their owners a sustained com-
petitive advantage. Nevertheless, and cited by Fombrun and Shanley (1990),
Caves and Porter (1977) accomplished that established reputation may prevent
managers' strategic responses to environmental events and it is thus a distinct
source of intra-industry structure;
• In a marketing approach, reputation, also deﬁned as brand image, describes the
corporate associations that individuals establish with the ﬁrm's name;
• In the organisational ﬁeld of study, corporate reputation represents a ﬁrm's cul-
ture and identity, which shapes a ﬁrm's business practices within their stake-
holders. Notwithstanding, the desire to protect reputation may inhibit ﬁrms and
their managers from engaging in activities that constituents consider unaccept-
able (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990);
• The sociological vision highlights the reputational rankings as part of the social
construct emanated from the relationship that ﬁrms establish with stakeholders
in their shared institutional environment. Thus, reputation is an indicator of le-
gitimacy, in other words, reputation aggregates assessments of ﬁrm's performance
relative to expectations and norms in an institutional ﬁeld;
• By last, the accounting perspective, which has been started to develop better
measures of how investments in branding, training, and research build impor-
tant intangible assets, considering the created value of those activities. Addi-
tional literature highlighted the potential for value creation throughout reputa-
tion (Roberts and Dowling, 2002), wherein it might be seen as an intangible asset
(Chun, 2005; Fombrun and Van Riel, 1997; Pfarrer et al., 2010), hard for com-
petitors to copy or acquire, endowing their owners with a sustained competitive
advantage (Fombrun and Van Riel, 1997; Roberts and Dowling, 2002).
Nonetheless, a jointly deﬁnition was recommended by Fombrun et al. (2000) who sug-
gested that corporate reputation denotes a collective construct that describes the ag-
gregate perceptions of multiple stakeholders over the ﬁrm's operation. Since corporate
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performance is a multi-dimensional construct, so is reputation, wherein it should re-
ﬂect the unique dimensions on what stakeholders base their judgements about the
ﬁrm's performance.
A research from Vergin and Qoronﬂeh (1998) noticed that reputation attracts and
keeps talented people, so the customers are more willing to purchase the ﬁrm's existing
products and services. Furthermore, sources of funding, equity and debt, are easier to
obtain if investors and bankers perceive the ﬁrm favourably. However, bad corporate
reputation might concern a ﬁrm with a demand or sales decrease, resulting from a state
of distress, situation that could occur when the ﬁxed obligations to creditors cannot
be met (Altman, 1984; Haugen and Senbet, 1978).
With those proposed approaches across reputation, Barnett et al. (2006) claimed the
urgency to create a unifying framework. One of the main barriers to the creation of a
universal deﬁnition was related to the confusion concerning the concepts of identity, im-
age, and reputation. Trying to achieve such deﬁnition, Barnett et al. (2006) presented
the following: "observers collective judgements of a corporation based on assessments
of the ﬁnancial, social, and environmental impacts attributed to the corporation over
time".
2.2 Reputation Measures
According to Chun (2005) and Fombrun et al. (2000), media rankings are the most
standard measures for reputation, wherein literature highlights the Fortune's World's
Most Admired Companies as one of the most cited. Concerning the Brown and Perry
(1994) research, Fortune's annual list of the Most Admired Companies, published early
each year since 1983, ranks of large corporations on the following eight qualitative at-
tributes: (1) ﬁnancial soundness, (2) long-term investment value, (3) use of corporate
assets, (4) innovativeness, (5) quality of ﬁrm's management, (6) quality of its products
and services, (7) ability to attract, develop, and keep talented people, and (8) acknow-
ledgement of social responsibility. Following Brown and Perry (1994), Fortune collects
data on the largest ﬁrms in over 30 industries, on what 8,000 executives, directors,
and market analysts are included in the survey sample, wherein each of whom reports
on the industry they follow. Literature also emphasises other annual worldwide repu-
tation rankings such as the Financial Times World's Most Respected Companies, the
Britain's Most Admired Companies from Management Today, and the Asia's Most
Admired Companies by Asian Business (Chun, 2005; Fombrun et al., 2000).
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Meanwhile, and according to Fombrun et al. (2000), the scale design for reputation
rankings widely employed by business media might not adequately measure the repu-
tation construct. The same authors defended that most surveys might restrict their
samples to larger ﬁrms, limiting consideration of emerging companies and industries.
According to the same authors, rankings also restrict to public traded ﬁrms. Fombrun
et al. (2000) also believed that those surveys relied on the perceptions of a limited re-
spondent pool that over-represents senior managers, directors, and ﬁnancial analysts,
not including the diﬀerent views from other key stakeholders.
Considering some biased information and a high correlation between the eight attrib-
utes inferred on the Fortune's surveys, Fombrun et al. (2000) developed an alternative
measure instrument for corporate reputation, known as the Reputation Quotient (RQ),
a multi-dimensional reputation scale, which has been presented as being more reliable
and robust. They assumed that corporate reputation can be explained by six cen-
tral reputation dimensions that inﬂuence stakeholders' behaviour and a ﬁrm's proﬁts
(Walsh and Wiedmann, 2004). Those six dimensions identiﬁed in the RQ may be
deﬁned as (1) emotional appeal, (2) products and services,(3) vision and leadership,
(4) workplace environment, (5) social and environment responsibility, and (6) ﬁnancial
performance (Walsh and Wiedmann, 2004).
Concerning such information regarding some weaknesses about media rankings, the
Fortune's WMAC survey will be endowed in this research. According to Brown and
Perry (1994), Fortune's WMAC ranking has been a response rate over to 50 percent,
indicator that described Fortune's survey samples as probably the largest within their
environment. Brown and Perry (1994) also underlined that Fortune's results are widely
circulated and cited in popular press outlets. Besides, it oﬀers data from a large sample
of industry experts assessing qualitative dimensions of organisational performance that
are diﬃcult to measure quantitatively. Also McGuire et al. (1990) classiﬁed Fortune's
rankings as some of the most comprehensive and widely broadcast surveys of managerial
attributes available. Moreover, Hammond and Slocum (1996) also believed that the
quality of respondents is comparable to those that could be obtained elsewhere since
respondents only rate ﬁrms with which they are familiar.
Numerous authors trusted on media rankings. For instance, Carmeli and Tishler
(2005); Fombrun and Shanley (1990); Hammond and Slocum (1996); McGuire et al.
(1990); Pfarrer et al. (2010); Roberts and Dowling (2002); Stuebs and Sun (2010) took
advantage from Fortune's rankings, where respondents rate ﬁrms in their own industry
or economic sector based on the eight key attributes.
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Notwithstanding, there were some researchers who used other media rankings to mea-
sure reputation. Tischer and Hildebrandt (2014), for instance, took advantage from
reputational rankings designed by the German business periodical Manager Magazin,
published in a two-year cycle between 1992 and 2008. This media ranking used to sur-
vey by phone senior executives, wherein they had to rate around 40 companies using
an eleven-point rate scale. Further researches, as the one from Sánchez and Sotorrío
(2007), considered the Spanish Monitor of Corporate Reputation (MERCO) instead
of media rankings. According to such authors, this measurement tool for reputation
(MERCO) asked managers to evaluate the diﬀerent ﬁrms according to six ﬁrst-level
variables: (1) economic-ﬁnancial results, (2) quality of the product-service, (3) cor-
porative culture and labour and ethical quality, (4) corporate social responsibility, (5)
overall size and international presence, and (6) innovation. This ﬁrst-level variables
were in turn reduced to other second-level variables. Finally, Raithel and Schwaiger
(2015), on the other hand, measured reputation employing a seven-point Likert scale,
where respondents were asked to answer about the 30 leading German securities listed
on the Deutsche Aktienindex (DAX).
The previous information regarding some reputation measures employed in prior aca-
demic researches, is summarised on the following table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Reputation Measures Review
Authors Reputation Measures
Fombrun and Shanley (1990)
This authors applied on their researches media rankings
on measuring reputation. Those rankings were based on
Fortune's lists.
McGuire et al. (1990)
Hammond and Slocum (1996)
Roberts and Dowling (2002)
Carmeli and Tishler (2005)
Stuebs and Sun (2010)
Pfarrer et al. (2010)
Tischer and Hildebrandt (2014) Such author also measured reputation with support from
media rankings designed by the German business
periodical Manager Magazine.
Sánchez and Sotorrío (2007) This author measured reputation according to the
Spanish Monitor of Corporate Reputation (MERCO).
Raithel and Schwaiger (2015) In this research, the author used a seven-point Likert
scale in order to measure reputation.
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2.3 Corporate Reputation and Firms' Financial Per-
formance
As seen in the previous sections, literature highlighted several researches concerning
the relationship between reputation and corporate performance. In the extent of such
approaches, we further present some empirical ﬁndings regarding that relationship.
Several authors, such as Fombrun and Shanley (1990); Hammond and Slocum (1996);
McGuire et al. (1990); Pfarrer et al. (2010); Roberts and Dowling (2002); Stuebs and
Sun (2010), conﬁrmed the existence of a relevant and positive relationship between
corporate reputation and ﬁrms' ﬁnancial performance, using the Fortune's rankings
as measure for reputation. For instance, Fombrun and Shanley (1990) conducted a
research with the purpose to analyse the relationship between reputation building and
information regarding ﬁrm's ﬁnancial performance. Some ﬁrm's ﬁnancial performance
indicators were obtained from market and accounting data as well as from institutional
and strategy indexes. To accomplish the research's purpose, Fombrun and Shanley
(1990) carried out a cross-sectional time series study, explaining reputation derived
from prior-year accounting data. With a sample of 292 U.S. ﬁrms from a 1985 study
of corporate reputation achieved by Fortune, Fombrun and Shanley (1990) believed
that stakeholders appear to construct reputation from a mix of signals originated from
accounting and market information, media reports, and other non-economic measures.
Similarly, Hammond and Slocum (1996) explored the association between reputation
and ﬁrm's ﬁnancial performance. Therefore, the authors assembled a sample 149 ﬁrms
from a 1993 Fortune's Most Admired list. Findings from Hammond and Slocum (1996)
suggested that management, in order to keep their ﬁrm's reputation, must be able to
control costs and deliver dividends to investors as close to their expectations as possible.
Thus, and according to the same authors, the short-term proﬁt should not be the single
goal of management, since most investors are risk averse.
A prior research from McGuire et al. (1990) examined two issues concerning the forma-
tion and eﬀects of qualitative perceptions of ﬁrm's ﬁnancial performance. First, the
authors tried to understand if ﬁrms' quantitative measures of performance inﬂuence
perceptions about the ﬁrm's management quality. Second, McGuire et al. (1990) stud-
ied if perceived ﬁrms' qualities aﬀect measures of ﬁrm's ﬁnancial performance. In order
to conduct a research over the above two issues, the authors built a sample of 131 U.S.
ﬁrms, considering an annual survey of corporate reputation accomplished by Fortune's
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magazine in 1983. Through correlations and regression analysis, McGuire et al. (1990)
found that ﬁrm and management quality inﬂuence a ﬁrm's future ﬁnancial perfor-
mance. However, the same ﬁndings denoted that growth in sales and operate income
performed a little impact on future evaluations of ﬁrm's quality.
Likewise, Pfarrer et al. (2010) explored the eﬀects of two intangible assets, (1) ﬁrm's
reputation and (2) celebrity, in organisational outcomes. To perform that, the same
authors observed 291 ﬁrms between 1991 and 2005 which appeared on the Fortune's
Most Admired Companies. Findings led Pfarrer et al. (2010) to suggest that reputable
ﬁrms, when comparing to low-reputable ones, might experience greater market rewards
for positive surprises, and smaller market penalties for negative announcements.
Additionally, Roberts and Dowling (2002) also studied corporate reputation and its
possible correlation with a sustained superior ﬁrm's performance over time. To execute
such goal, Roberts and Dowling (2002) used reputation data from 540 ﬁrms, between
1984 and 1998, embedded in the Fortune 1000 annual ranking1. Results supported
the evidence that superior-performing ﬁrms with good reputation standards, found
themselves with an advantage which is durable on the short run. Nevertheless, Roberts
and Dowling (2002) highlighted the fact that reputation might become less relevant
over time, allowing the possibility to hurt superior-performing ﬁrms in the long run.
In order to empirically investigate corporate reputation's linkage with labour eﬃciency,
productivity, and costs, Stuebs and Sun (2010) compared ﬁrms listed on Fortune's Most
Admired Companies with a similar set of matched ﬁrms not listed on such ranking.
With a two-sample merging process, Stuebs and Sun (2010) became with a ﬁnal sample
of 224 U.S. ﬁrm-year observations. Results conﬁrmed that reputation was positively
associated with improved labour eﬃciency and productivity, reﬂecting such improve-
ments on the overall ﬁrm's performance.
There were other authors, such as Sánchez and Sotorrío (2007); Tischer and Hildebrandt
(2014); Raithel and Schwaiger (2015), who also explored and found positive associations
among corporate reputation and ﬁrms' ﬁnancial performance. On this researches, me-
dia measures, including Fortune, for reputation, were replaced by other non-media
measure tools.
Sánchez and Sotorrío (2007), for instance, proposed a theoretical model which could
explain the process of value creation from reputation generated by ﬁrms. Therefore,
1Fortune 1000 is a list created by Fortune magazine detailing the 1,000 largest companies in the
U.S. based on their revenues
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the same authors built a sample containing the 88 most reputable ﬁrms in Spain during
2004. In this situation, Sánchez and Sotorrío (2007) based their reputation data on
MERCO, a Spanish indicator about ﬁrms' reputation. Results obtained suggested that
the process of value creation by ﬁrms, by means of their reputation, was moderate or
inﬂuenced by a series of contingent factors such as diﬀerentiation strategy, competitive
intensity, and power of stakeholders.
In order to investigate whether announcing signiﬁcant positive or negative changes of
corporate reputation measures aﬀect shareholders' value in the same direction, Tischer
and Hildebrandt (2014) conducted an event study with the attempt to explore the
impact of reputation rankings' publication on share prices in the Frankfurt stock ex-
change. Results suggested that the publication of reputation rankings performed an
impact on shareholders' value. As expected, Tischer and Hildebrandt (2014) believed
that whether a positive or negative announcement eﬀect exists if the relative ranking
position has signiﬁcantly improved in comparison to competitors.
Literature also denoted a recent research from Raithel and Schwaiger (2015). This
study demonstrated how shareholder's value, measured by future stock returns, be-
haved in terms of reputation perceptions issued by the general public. According to
this, Raithel and Schwaiger (2015) took part from a sample that ranged from 1,251
to 2,465 telephone interviews, were respondents were asked to answer about the 30
leading German securities listed on DAX. Results attested that superior reputation
perceptions issued by the general public increased shareholder's value, creating more
wealth to the shareholder in terms of positive abnormal stock returns in the long term.
Furthermore, Raithel and Schwaiger (2015) indicated that reputation perceptions that
are driven by non-ﬁnancial aspects might create signiﬁcantly more shareholder's value
in the future than reputation perceptions driven by previous ﬁnancial performance.
According to literature, there are some other authors who achieved diﬀerent results
from those previously presented. Carmeli and Tishler (2005), for instance, explored
the relationship between organisational reputation and ﬁrm's ﬁnancial performance
taking advantage from 86 industrial ﬁrms based on Israel. The authors showed through
descriptive statistics and a path analysis that reputation was associated with ﬁrm's
growth and accumulation of customers' orders, but it was not directly associated with
market share, proﬁtability, and ﬁnancial strength.
Additionally, Rose and Thomsen (2004) used image ratings instead of reputation from
a Danish business periodical. The authors performed descriptive statistics and a factor
analysis with support from 263 joint ﬁrm-year observations, between 1996 and 2001,
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of image and market-to-book value from a sample of 62 ﬁrms. According to Rose and
Thomsen (2004), research ﬁndings came to challenge the conventional wisdom, since
results conﬁrmed that corporate reputation did not impact the ﬁrm's value. Nonethe-
less, the same ﬁndings corroborated the hypothesis that ﬁrm's ﬁnancial performance
improves corporate reputation.
In the extent of the prior literature analysis, we further illustrate, on table 2.2, the
researches previously analysed, itemised by author, reputation measures used on each
research, some ﬁrm's ﬁnancial performance indicators, and the main achievements,
whether positive or negative, concerning the association between corporate reputation
and ﬁrms' ﬁnancial performance.
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Table 2.2: Literature Review - A Broadened Analysis
Authors Reputation Measures Performance Measures Findings
Fombrun and Shanley (1990)
Media rankings based on
Fortune's lists.
Market and accounting
measures.
Positive association between reputation and
ﬁrm's performance.
McGuire et al. (1990)
Hammond and Slocum (1996)
Roberts and Dowling (2002)
Pfarrer et al. (2010)
Carmeli and Tishler (2005)
Media rankings based on
Fortune's lists.
Firms' ﬁnancials and
labour eﬃciency.
This authors found some positive associations
between reputation and ﬁrm's ﬁnancial
performance. However, further achievements
were obtained denoting no evidence between
reputation and labour cost advantage, market
share, ﬁrm's proﬁtability, or ﬁnancial strength.
Stuebs and Sun (2010)
Tischer and Hildebrandt (2014) Media rankings designed
by the German business
periodical Manager
Magazin.
Cash ﬂows generated by
ﬁrms' operations.
Publication of reputation rankings had a
positive impact on shareholders' value.
Sánchez and Sotorrío (2007)
MERCO
Accounting measures of
performance (ROA).
The building process of reputation was
inﬂuenced by diﬀerentiation strategy,
competitive intensity and stakeholders' power.
Rose and Thomsen (2004) Image ratings from a
Danish business
periodical.
Market-to-book value.
No association between corporate reputation
and ﬁrm's value.
Raithel and Schwaiger (2015)
Seven-point Likert scale.
Market and accounting
measures (ROA and
Market Value).
Shareholders' value increased in terms of
positive abnormal stock returns in the long
term.
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Chapter 3
Research Design
This chapter characterises the empirical investigation and it is organised as follows:
objectives and hypotheses, methodology, sample selection and data collection.
3.1 Objectives and Hypotheses
As seen in the previous chapter, the relationship between corporate reputation and
ﬁrm's ﬁnancial performance has received some attention in the scientiﬁc ﬁeld. This
research follows that association widely described in literature. Roberts and Dowling
(2002), for instance, realised that ﬁrms which possess relatively good reputation stan-
dards experience higher chances of sustaining superior performance over time. Sharpe
(1964) described expected returns as an inverse function of systematic risk, thus, since
a greater reputation implies a decrease over the systematic risk exhibition, we expect
to verify if shareholders who invest in highly reputable ﬁrms, such as those listed on
Fortune, expect smaller stock returns due to the less systematic risk they undergo,
when comparing with those who invest on ﬁrms with low reputation standards.
In line with Hammond and Slocum (1996) and Pfarrer et al. (2010), we will use the
Fortune's WMAC ranking of 2015 to measure reputation. As Barnett et al. (2006)
mentioned on their research, reputation might be seen as the stakeholders' insight
on a ﬁrm's attributes over time, such as ﬁnancial, social, and environmental. Since
Fortune's rankings measure reputation on large ﬁrms respecting some qualitative at-
tributes, including ﬁnancial, innovativeness, overall quality, human resource practices,
and social responsibility, we may argue then that Fortune's WMAC 2015 suits our
research purposes. Moreover, Fortune only ranks quoted companies and, as we will
narrow our sample to ﬁrms listed on both NYSE and NASDAQ stock exchanges due
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to an easy acquisition on ﬁrm's data, we recognise another positive attribute on using
Fortune's WMAC 2015. Thus, some of the weaknesses about Fortune's rankings pre-
viously denoted in literature by Fombrun et al. (2000), for instance, are not relevant
on this research.
With respect to the previous information, we present our research hypotheses:
H1: Firms listed on Fortune's WMAC experience a lower systematic risk
when comparing to those not listed in the same ranking.
H2: Firms listed on Fortune's WMAC undergo into diﬀerent abnormal
returns when comparing to those not listed in the same ranking.
3.2 Methodology
In order to perform our research, we will take advantage from an adaptation of the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This model, according to Fama and French
(2004), oﬀers powerful foresights about how to measure risk and the relation between
expected return and risk. Also known as the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM (1964;1965), later
explored by some authors, including Jensen (1967), Fama (1968) and Black (1972),
is based on the assumptions that (1) all investors are risk averse, (2) all investors
have identical decision horizons and homogeneous expectations regarding investment
opportunities, (3) all investors are able to choose among portfolios solely on the basis
of expected returns and variance of returns, (4) all transaction costs and taxes are zero,
and (5) all assets are inﬁnitely divisible (Jensen, 1967).
Following Jensen (1967) and the hypothesis that the capital market is in equilibrium,
the CAPM model yields the following expression:
E(Ri) = Rf + β ∗ [E(Rm)−Rf ]
Where:
E(Ri) = the expected one-period return on asset i.
Rf = the one-period risk free interest rate.
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β = the measure of risk.
E(Rm) = the expect one-period return on the "market portfolio".
According to Fama and French (2004), the CAPM is also used to measure the perfor-
mance of mutual funds and other managed portfolios. Dating to 1968, Jensen estimated
a CAPM time-series regression model, using the intercept Jensen's alpha to measure
abnormal performance (Fama and French, 2004). Regarding such information, the
updated CAPM model can be represented as:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi ∗ (Rm,t −Rf,t) + εi,t
Considering the prior information, we will use the intercept α to measure abnormal
returns, considering a division between ﬁrms listed on Fortune and ﬁrms not listed in
the same ranking. Thus, our model yields the following expression:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αnrep + βnrep ∗ (Rm,t −Rf,t) + αrep ∗Di + βrep ∗Di ∗ (Rm,t −Rf,t) + εi,t
All variables and parameters embedded in our model are described on the following
table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Variables/Parameters Description
Variables/
Parameters Description
Ri,t Return of stock i on week t.
Rf,t Risk free return on week t.
Ri,t −Rf,t Risk premium of stock i on week t.
αnrep Constant parameter for estimation which denotes the abnormal re-
turns of ﬁrms not listed on Fortune.
βnrep Coeﬃcient for estimation which measures the sensibility of stock
returns from ﬁrms not listed on Fortune due to changes on market
returns.
Rm,t Market return on week t.
Rm,t −Rf,t Market risk premium on week t.
αrep Constant parameter for estimation which denotes the variation of
abnormal returns from ﬁrms listed on Fortune, when comparing to
those not listed in the same ranking.
Di Dummy variable coded 1 if ﬁrm i is listed on Fortune in year 2015,
otherwise 0.
βrep Coeﬃcient for estimation which measures the sensibility's change
of stock returns from ﬁrms listed on Fortune due to variations on
market returns, when comparing to those not listed on Fortune.
To perform this model we got through a set of estimations provided by gretl, a speciﬁc
software for statistical ends. Running a panel data analysis, we explored the Pooled
OLS, the Fixed-eﬀects, and the Random-eﬀects models. Each estimation went over
some tests, such as the F Test, the Breusch-Pagan Test, or the Hausman Test, in
order to determine the models' quality and its consequent validation. Finished this
step, we also compared the estimations, according to the Schwarz criterion, to obtain
a parsimonious model.
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3.3 Sample and Data
Financial data, including price and market value from NYSE and NASDAQ con-
stituents, was obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream each Friday between Decem-
ber 26th, 2014 and January 1st, 2016. Additionally, we collected similar ﬁnancial in-
formation from S&P 500 Composite and NASDAQ 100 from the same database, re-
garding the same time period. With this values we were able to calculate the stock
and market's returns, using the continuously compounded return formula. Finally, the
Risk free return on week t (Rf,t) was obtained considering the '4-week Treasury Bill
Secondary Market rate', available in the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System1 between December 26th, 2014 and January 1st, 2016.
Our research's sample was supported by 462 U.S. ﬁrms listed on NYSE and NASDAQ
observed each Friday from December 26th, 2014 to January 1st, 2016, achieving a total
of 24,486 observations. From those 462 U.S. ﬁrms, 358 were listed on NYSE, whereas
104 were quoted on NASDAQ. Since more than 70% of all ﬁrms listed on Fortune's
WMAC 2015 ranking were based in the United States of America stock exchanges, we
focused then on U.S. ﬁrms.
In order to achieve a ﬁnal sample of 462 U.S. ﬁrms, we ﬁrst managed an analysis
on the Fortune's WMAC where, from a list of 350 worldwide ﬁrms, we only selected
U.S. ﬁrms, as seen before, which were listed on NYSE or NASDAQ stock exchanges,
fulﬁlling a sample of 231 ﬁrms. Then, we built a matched sample of U.S. ﬁrms which
were not listed on Fortune. To accomplish that, we selected, according to the higher
market value, a list of 231 ﬁrms from NYSE and NASDAQ stock exchanges that were
not listed on Fortune's WMAC in the 2015 ranking.
The previous information is summarised in the following table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Sample Split According to the Fortune's WMAC Ranking
NASDAQ NYSE Total
Reputation Listed on Fortune's WMAC 52 179 231
Not Listed on Fortune's
WMAC
52 179 231
Total 104 358 462
Percentage 22,5 77,5
1http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm
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The prior table 3.2 allowed us to infer that 77,5% of our sample was composed by ﬁrms
listed on NYSE while 22,5% comported to ﬁrms indexed on NASDAQ. The same table
also provides information regarding the sample's split, where both reduced samples
equally represent the total of ﬁrms listed on Fortune and those not listed in the same
ranking.
Next we present some graphs describing our sample in terms of sectors' activity. We
took into consideration the Global Industry Classiﬁcation Standard (GICS) as method-
ology for sectors' classiﬁcation.
In the ﬁrst graph, presented on ﬁgure 3.1, we explored the sectors activity for the
NASDAQ stock exchange, by means of their ﬁrms' classiﬁcation: (1) Listed on Fortune
WMAC, and (2) Not Listed on Fortune WMAC. Consumer Services and Technology
were the sectors with more enrolments on Fortune's WMAC, with nearly 20% of the
corresponding sample. Those, along with Health Care, were also the sectors with more
ﬁrms which did not appear on the 2015 Fortune's WMAC ranking, up to 15%.
The second graph, illustrated on the same ﬁgure 3.1, clearly denoted a diﬀerent sce-
nario. Analysing the sectors activity for the NYSE stock exchange, we identiﬁed Con-
sumer Goods, Consumer Services, Financials, and Industrials as the sectors with more
ﬁrms listed on Fortune's WMAC, with 6% to 12% of the corresponding sample. Finan-
cials also appeared as the sector with more ﬁrms which were not ranking on Fortune,
with nearly 12%, followed by Oil & Gas and Industrials.
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Figure 3.1: Sector Reputation Activity by Stock Exchange
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In the following table 3.3 we explored and analysed some descriptive statistics measures
regarding the stock returns' variable previously obtained. Comparing both maximum
values in table 3.3 we concluded that ﬁrms listed on Fortune's WMAC experience
greater positive stock returns comparing to those not listed on Fortune. When ana-
lysing both minimum values, we denoted that negative sock returns can be larger for
ﬁrms listed on Fortune.
Concerning both mean and median values, we may argue that whether listed on For-
tune's WMAC or not, both type of ﬁrms experience negative stock returns. The median
values led us to believe that nearly 50% of our sample's stock returns were negative.
Moreover, the median value was lower for ﬁrms listed on Fortune's WMAC.
Table 3.3: Sample's Descriptive Statistics
Number of Observations (2015) - 24,486
Weekly Stock
Returns
Statistic
Listed on For-
tune WMAC
Mean -0,001359888
95% Conﬁdence
Interval for Mean
Lower
Bound
-0,001987245
Upper
Bound
-0,000732530
Median -0,000591891
Minimum -0,378517546
Maximum 0,5427290490
Not Listed on
Fortune WMAC
Mean -0,001119483
95% Conﬁdence
Interval for Mean
Lower
Bound
-0,001776644
Upper
Bound
-0,000462323
Median -0,000481812
Minimum -0,350053786
Maximum 0,3904249350
20
Next, we perform a non-parametric analysis. To accomplish such analysis we will use
the Independent-samples Mann-Whitney U test which explores the Weekly Stock Re-
turns grouped into two categories: (1) Not Listed on Fortune's WMAC, and (2) Listed
on Fortune's WMAC. The Mann-Whitney U test yields the following null hypothesis:
H0: The distribution of weekly stock returns is the same across the two
categories previously presented as (1) Firms Not Listed on Fortune's
WMAC, and (2) Firms Listed on Fortune's WMAC.
Test's results are bestowed in the next table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Mann-Whitney U Test for Mean Values
Number of Observations (2015) - 24,486
Weekly Stock
Returns
N Mean Rank Statistics
(p-value)
Not Listed on
Fortune WMAC
12243 12264,80
Listed on Fortune
WMAC
12243 12222,20
Total 24486
Mann-Whitney
U Test
0,637
Concerning the previous outcome, we advanced, for 10% signiﬁcance level, that the
distribution of weekly stock returns was the same across the two sample's categories,
since we did not reject the null hypothesis. In other words, there is no statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the mean rank values of both sample's categories.
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Chapter 4
Empirical Results and Discussion
4.1 Results
In the previous chapter, we identiﬁed our hypotheses as well as the methodology re-
quired to accomplish our research's aim. As earlier deﬁned in our methodology, we
decided to perform a panel data analysis across 24,486 ﬁrm-year observations. Since
panel data studies can be explored through some standard approaches, including Pooled
OLS, Fixed-eﬀects, and Random-eﬀects models, we ﬁrst needed to choose the one that
better ﬁts our research purposes. Thus, in order to achieve a parsimonious model, we
estimated those three models, so we could perform some tests, including the F Test
and the Hausman Test, and compare some criteria between models, in order to select
one for analysis.
Regarding the prior approach on panel data analysis, we ﬁrst explored the F Test to
understand which the Pooled OLS or the Fixed-eﬀects should we select. Since the null
hypothesis was rejected for 1% signiﬁcance level, see table 5.2 in appendices, then the
Fixed-eﬀects model will be endowed.
Considering such ﬁndings, we conducted a second analysis between Fixed and Random-
eﬀects. According to Clark and Linzer (2015), researchers often rely in the Hausman
Test to decide between Fixed-eﬀects or Random-eﬀects. This test has been designed
to detect correlation between the independent variable and the unit eﬀects (Clark and
Linzer, 2015). As illustrated in the next table 4.1, we did not reject the null hypothesis
for 1% signiﬁcance level, thus no correlation was found between the independent vari-
able and the unit eﬀects. Therefore we should reject the Fixed-eﬀects in favour of the
Random-eﬀects model.
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Additionally, Baltagi and Li (1991) cited the Breusch-Pagan Test as an extent measure
to analyse Random-eﬀects 's quality. According to this authors, the null hypothesis in
this test is that variance across entities is zero. Since we rejected the null hypothesis
for 1% signiﬁcance level, we concluded that the Random-eﬀects model is statistically
suitable.
In the next table 4.1, we present the results obtained from estimating the Random-
eﬀects model.
Table 4.1: Random-eﬀects Model's Estimation
Model: Random-eﬀects (GLS), using 24,486 observations
Included 462 cross-sectional units/Time-series length = 53
Dependent variable: Ri −Rf
Coeﬃcient Std. Error p-value
αnrep −0.00107582 0.000315513 0.0007 ***
βnrep 0.874907 0.0140408 0.0000 ***
αrep −0.000238568 0.000446202 0.5929
βrep 0.0318310 0.0198567 0.1089
Schwarz criterion −99846.65
Breusch-Pagan Test: with p-value = 0.000481291
Hausman Test: with p-value = 0.228707
Results presented on table 4.1 disclose that the positive variation hold by the systematic
risk β of ﬁrms listed on Fortune's WMAC is not statistically signiﬁcant, thus we cannot
verify that ﬁrms listed on Fortune's WMAC experience a lower systematic risk then
those not listed in the same ranking, as hypothesised.
Results concerning the abnormal returns α of ﬁrms listed on Fortune's WMAC did
not support our second hypothesis that ﬁrms listed on Fortune's WMAC undergo into
diﬀerent abnormal returns when comparing to those not listed in the same ranking.
Regarding such results we cannot reject the hypothesis of such variation on abnormal
returns of ﬁrms listed on Fortune's WMAC being equal to zero, when comparing to
those ﬁrms not listed in the same ranking.
In the light of this events, we further analyse the results robustness in order to observe
if diﬀerent results exist, from those previous obtained, when estimating for each stock
exchange (NYSE and NASDAQ), and for each sector.
24
4.2 Results Robustness
To perform the results robustness, we took into consideration two main constructs.
First, we analysed according to stock exchange where ﬁrms were listed (NYSE and
NASDAQ). In a second approach, we managed the results robustness taking into con-
sideration a sector analysis.
4.2.1 Stock Exchange Robustness Analysis
To accomplish this analysis, the overall sample was split by stock exchange (1) NYSE,
and (2) NASDAQ. Thereafter, a panel data analysis was carried out for each stock
exchange.
Since the total number of observations was diﬀerent after the sample's split, the
Random-eﬀects was not assumed as standard estimation model. Regarding such in-
formation, we executed, at ﬁrst, the Pooled OLS and the Fixed-eﬀects estimations.
According to the F Test, we rejected, for 1% signiﬁcance level, the Pooled OLS in
favour of the Fixed-eﬀects model (see table 5.4 in appendices).
The previous decision led to a second analysis between the Fixed-eﬀects and the
Random-eﬀects models. Since the Hausman Test was not provided when estimating the
Random-eﬀects model, the Breusch-Pagan Test was used to compare both models, as
illustrated on table 4.2. Since the null hypothesis was rejected for 1% signiﬁcance level,
we proceeded, according to Baltagi and Li (1991), with the Random-eﬀects model.
Results are bestowed in the following table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: RE Estimation: NYSE Stock Exchange Robustness Analysis
Model: Random-eﬀects (GLS), using 18,974 observations
Included 358 cross-sectional units/Time-series length = 53
Dependent variable: Ri −Rf
Coeﬃcient Std. Error p-value
αnrep −0.00124348 0.000340552 0.0003 ***
βnrep 0.921507 0.0162778 0.0000 ***
αrep 0.000160911 0.000481613 0.7383
βrep 0.00367422 0.0230203 0.8732
Schwarz criterion −79407.36
Breusch-Pagan Test: with p-value = 0.00191428
Hausman Test: with p-value = NA
In the previous table, regarding a panel data analysis across the NYSE stock exchange,
we observed, without statistics signiﬁcance, a positive deviation in the systematic risk's
variation of ﬁrms both listed on NYSE and Fortune's WMAC. Such analysis supports
the previous obtained results.
Analysing the abnormal returns α, we denoted a positive deviation in the abnormal
returns' variation of ﬁrms simultaneous listed on Fortune's WMAC and NYSE. There-
fore, such diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant, thus our initial results are veriﬁed.
In line with this ﬁndings, the initial results were corroborated by this robustness test.
Next we perform a panel data analysis across the NASDAQ stock exchange.
As standard procedure, we ﬁrst estimated the Pooled OLS and Fixed-eﬀects models.
Regarding the F Test, the null hypothesis was not rejected for 1% signiﬁcance level
(see table 5.5 in appendices). This result led us to reject the Fixed-eﬀects model in
favour of the Pooled OLS.
Results from estimating the Pooled OLS model are illustrated in the next table 4.3.
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Table 4.3: OLS Estimation: NASDAQ Stock Exchange Robustness Analysis
Model: Pooled OLS, using 5,512 observations
Included 104 cross-sectional units/Time-series length = 53
Dependent variable: Ri −Rf
Coeﬃcient Std. Error p-value
αnrep −0.000319752 0.000696699 0.6463
βnrep 0.779530 0.0283824 0.0000 ***
αrep −0.00172442 0.000985281 0.0801 *
βrep 0.0916616 0.0401388 0.0224 **
Schwarz criterion −20811.52
When analysing the systematic risk β in the previous table 4.3, a statistically signiﬁcant
increase was found for a 5% signiﬁcance level over the systematic risk's variation of
ﬁrms both listed on Fortune's WMAC and NASDAQ stock exchange, when comparing
to those not listed on Fortune. Such results did not meet our initial ﬁndings. However,
it also did not corroborate our ﬁrst hypothesis, on what ﬁrms listed on Fortune's
WMAC experience a lower systematic risk when comparing to those not listed in the
same ranking.
Analysing the abnormal returns α on table 4.3, we observed, for a 10% signiﬁcance
level, a signiﬁcant negative deviation on the abnormal returns' variation of ﬁrms both
listed on Fortune's WMAC and NASDAQ stock exchange. The current analysis also
did not meet the initial ﬁndings. Besides, such evidence supports the second research
hypothesis, on what ﬁrms listed on Fortune's WMAC undergo into diﬀerent abnormal
returns when comparing to those not listed in the same ranking. In this situation, we
are able to reject the hypothesis that such variation on abnormal returns of ﬁrms listed
on Fortune's WMAC is equal to zero, when comparing to those ﬁrms not listed in the
same ranking.
In the next subsection, a results robustness is performed for a detailed sector's estima-
tion.
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4.2.2 Sector Activity Robustness Analysis
In this second approach, we performed a results robustness across our results with
respect to sectors wherein ﬁrms were classiﬁed according to the GICS methodology.
As illustrated on ﬁgure 3.1, our sample is dispersed over ten major sectors. Therefore,
we coded the variable sector into nine dummy variables.
Following the same methodology previous applied, ﬁrst we conducted a Pooled OLS and
Fixed-eﬀects estimations. Regarding the F Test, the null hypothesis was not rejected
for 1% signiﬁcance level (see table 5.7 in appendices). Such result led us to select the
Pooled OLS model instead of the Fixed-eﬀects.
Table 4.4: OLS Estimation: Sector's Robustness Analysis
Model: Pooled OLS, using 24,486 observations
Included 462 cross-sectional units/Time-series length = 53
Dependent variable: Ri −Rf
Coeﬃcient Std. Error p-value
αnrep 0.00115879 0.000591025 0.0499 **
βnrep 0.874235 0.0140516 0.0000 ***
αrep −0.000784603 0.000414462 0.0584 *
βrep 0.0324128 0.0198709 0.1029
SecD1 −0.00170066 0.000754018 0.0241 **
SecD2 −0.00148306 0.000735979 0.0439 **
SecD3 −0.000256490 0.000825679 0.7561
SecD4 −0.00187953 0.000746015 0.0118 **
SecD5 −0.00447310 0.00118433 0.0002 ***
SecD6 −0.00711084 0.000915442 0.0000 ***
SecD7 −0.00224533 0.000825971 0.0066 ***
SecD8 −0.00177007 0.00172451 0.3047
SecD9 −0.00320585 0.00109032 0.0033 ***
Schwarz criterion −99834.37
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Results regarding the systematic risk β presented in the previous table 4.4 revealed,
without statistics signiﬁcance, a positive deviation on the systematic risk's variation
of ﬁrms listed on Fortune's WMAC, when comparing to those not listed in the same
ranking. Such analysis corroborates our initial results.
Analysing the abnormal returns α, we observed, for a 10% signiﬁcance level, a negative
deviation on the abnormal returns's variation of ﬁrms listed on Fortune's WMAC.
Such results did not meet our prior ﬁndings. Besides, this analysis supports the second
research hypothesis, wherein ﬁrms listed on Fortune's WMAC undergo into diﬀerent
abnormal returns when comparing to those not listed in the same ranking.
This results robustness analysis also indicates that there are clearly some sectors per-
forming a signiﬁcant impact in the dependent variable. This might explain the signiﬁc-
ant variation observed on the abnormal returns α of ﬁrms listed on Fortune's WMAC.
Since the ﬁrst research hypothesis, regarding a systematic risk decreasing over ﬁrms
listed on Fortune's WMAC was not observed in this situation, perhaps it will be inter-
esting to perform a panel data analysis for each sector, and eventually for each stock
exchange with a sector's detailing estimation.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
We broadly introduced over the current research some concepts about reputation, as
well as its implications across organisations as Weigelt and Camerer (1988), Fombrun
and Shanley (1990), Roberts and Dowling (2002), and Walker (2010) documented on
their researches. This relationship was in the basis of this research, among with other
ﬁnance key concepts, including the abnormal returns and the systematic risk concepts.
In this extent, we built the research model, which mainly consisted on relating ﬁrms'
abnormal returns with ﬁrms' reputation, measured by Fortune's WMAC ranking of
2015.
According to the documented literature, we should expect, for reputable ﬁrms, small
abnormal returns, since the risk shareholders are willing to take is smaller when com-
paring to those ﬁrms with small market capitalisation.
Achieving a sample of 462 U.S. ﬁrms listed on NYSE and NASDAQ stock exchanges,
wherein 231 of those ﬁrms were also listed on Fortune's WMAC, we counted 24,486
observations occurred each Friday between December 26th, 2014 and January 1st, 2016.
Therefore, we converted such data into a panel data estimation, performed by gretl
software.
Estimation results did not provide us signiﬁcant deviations, whether for the systematic
risk or for the abnormal returns of ﬁrms listed on Fortune's WMAC. Therefore, without
statistics support, we could not verify both of our research hypotheses, wherein ﬁrms
listed on Fortune's WMAC might experience a lower systematic risk and, as well, they
might incur into diﬀerent abnormal returns when comparing to those ﬁrms not listed
on Fortune's WMAC.
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When testing our results robustness, we observed some deviations from our main re-
sults. Analysing the results robustness by stock exchange, we observed that for ﬁrms
quoted in the NASDAQ stock exchange, which represent nearly 23% of our sample,
there were signiﬁcant changes in the systematic risk, as well as in the abnormal returns
of ﬁrms listed on Fortune's WMAC.
When analysing our results robustness with a sector's decomposed estimation, we ob-
served some sectors with a clear signiﬁcant inﬂuence over our results.
With this said, it will be interesting, for further researching, analyse possible abnormal
returns and systematic risk changes from ﬁrms not listed on Fortune, or other media
ranking, to ﬁrms listed on Fortune taking into consideration the sector were ﬁrms are
based.
Since we did not obtain signiﬁcant results, we could not validate our research hypo-
theses. Possible eﬀects might concern the fact that we included in our sample only
quoted ﬁrms from both NYSE and NASDAQ stock exchanges, most of all large market
capitalisation ﬁrms which did not necessarily bring huge returns to shareholders in a
short period of time. Thus, for further researching, it will be necessary to perform a
similar research wherein the sample might include ﬁrms from emerging markets.
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Appendices
Appendix 5.1: Pooled OLS Estimation
Model: Pooled OLS, using 24,486 observations
Included 462 cross-sectional units / Time-series length = 53
Dependent variable: Ri −Rf
Coeﬃcient Std. Error p-value
const −0.00107582 0.000284469 0.0002 ***
Rm −Rf 0.875015 0.0140705 0.0000 ***
Di −0.000238581 0.000402301 0.5532
Di ∗ (Rm −Rf ) 0.0315943 0.0198987 0.1124
Schwarz criterion −99846.65
Appendix 5.2: Fixed-eﬀects Estimation
Model: Fixed-eﬀects, using 24,486 observations
Included 462 cross-sectional units / Time-series length = 53
Dependent variable: Ri −Rf
Coeﬃcient Std. Error p-value
const −0.00119510 0.000200702 0.0000 ***
Rm −Rf 0.874450 0.0140467 0.0000 ***
Di ∗ (Rm −Rf ) 0.0328368 0.0198651 0.0983 *
Schwarz criterion −95771.74
F Test p-value = 0.000413
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Appendix 5.3: OLS Estimation: NYSE Stock Exchange Robustness Analysis
Model: Pooled OLS, using 18,974 observations
Included 358 cross-sectional units/Time-series length = 53
Dependent variable: Ri −Rf
Coeﬃcient Std. Error p-value
αnrep −0.00124348 0.000306285 0.0000 ***
βnrep 0.921507 0.0163147 0.0000 ***
αrep 0.000160911 0.000433152 0.7103
βrep 0.00367422 0.0230725 0.8735
Schwarz criterion −79407.36
Appendix 5.4: FE Estimation: NYSE Stock Exchange Robustness Analysis
Model: Fixed-eﬀects, using 18,974 observations
Included 358 cross-sectional units/Time-series length = 53
Dependent variable: Ri −Rf
Coeﬃcient Std. Error p-value
αnrep −0.00116302 0.000216086 0.0000 ***
βnrep 0.921507 0.0162778 0.0000 ***
βrep 0.00367422 0.0230203 0.8732
Schwarz criterion −76345.90
F Test p-value = 0.00139051
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Appendix 5.5: FE Estimation: NASDAQ Stock Exchange Robustness Analysis
Model: Fixed-eﬀects, using 5,512 observations
Included 104 cross-sectional units/Time-series length = 53
Dependent variable: Ri −Rf
Coeﬃcient Std. Error p-value
αnrep −0.00118196 0.000491598 0.0162 **
βnrep 0.779530 0.0283224 0.0000 ***
βrep 0.0916616 0.0400539 0.0221 **
Schwarz criterion −20059.20
F Test p-value = 0.0600285
Appendix 5.6: RE Estimation: NASDAQ Stock Exchange Robustness Analysis
Model: Random-eﬀects, using 5,512 observations
Included 104 cross-sectional units/Time-series length = 53
Dependent variable: Ri −Rf
Coeﬃcient Std. Error p-value
αnrep −0.000319752 0.000770633 0.6782
βnrep 0.779530 0.0283224 0.0000 ***
αrep −0.00172442 0.00108984 0.1136
βrep 0.0916616 0.0400539 0.0221 **
Schwarz criterion −20811.52
Breusch-Pagan Test: with p-value = 0.142668
Hausman Test: with p-value = NA
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Appendix 5.7: FE Estimation: Sector's Robustness Analysis
Model: Fixed-eﬀects, using 24,486 observations
Included 462 cross-sectional units/Time-series length = 53
Dependent variable: Ri −Rf
Coeﬃcient Std. Error p-value
αnrep −0.00119510 0.000200702 0.0000 ***
βnrep 0.874450 0.0140467 0.0000 ***
βrep 0.0328368 0.0198651 0.0983 *
Schwarz criterion −95771.74
F Test: with p-value = 0.098037
Appendix 5.8: RE Estimation: Sector's Robustness Analysis
Model: Random-eﬀects (GLS), using 24,486 observations
Included 462 cross-sectional units/Time-series length = 53
Dependent variable: Ri −Rf
Coeﬃcient Std. Error p-value
αnrep 0.00115879 0.000615652 0.0598 *
βnrep 0.874252 0.0140409 0.0000 ***
αrep −0.000784597 0.000431732 0.0692 *
βrep 0.0324466 0.0198558 0.1022
SecD1 −0.00170067 0.000785436 0.0304 **
SecD2 −0.00148306 0.000766647 0.0531 *
SecD3 −0.000256494 0.000860084 0.7655
SecD4 −0.00187953 0.000777101 0.0156 **
SecD5 −0.00447309 0.00123368 0.0003 ***
SecD6 −0.00711083 0.000953587 0.0000 ***
SecD7 −0.00224537 0.000860385 0.0091 ***
SecD8 −0.00177007 0.00179637 0.3245
SecD9 −0.00320585 0.00113576 0.0048 ***
Schwarz criterion −99834.37
Breusch-Pagan Test: with p-value = 0.35012
Hausman Test: with p-value = 0.289874
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